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The point of departure for this paper is a surprising finding from an economic experiment. 
Tjøtta (2016) designs a more or less game, where participants are asked to choose between 
receiving 450 kroner or 250 kroner, conditional on winning a lottery. There is no mention of 
what happens to foregone money if participants choose the alternative with less money, the 
choice does not affect the probability of winning the lottery, and the experiment is double 
blinded. Unlike the dictator game, choosing less money in the more or less game does not 
imply more money for someone else. It is therefore very surprising that almost one third of 
participants in the more or less game choose less money over more.  
The paper examines if social norms can explain this surprising finding. Social norms have 
been shown to explain behavior in dictator games very well (Krupka and Weber 2013, 
Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2016), can they also explain behavior in the more or less game?  
Two main questions are asked: (1) Does social norms differ between the more or less game 
and the dictator game, or do people interpret them as the same situation? (2) Can social norms 
explain why some people choose less money over more?  
To gain a better understanding of social behavior such as sharing, reciprocity, cooperation, 
contribution to public goods and costly punishment, it is important to understand what really 
motivates people to choose less money over more. Is it social norms or something else? 
To examine the two main questions, two economic experiments are conducted. The first 
experiment replicates the more or less experiment from Tjøtta (2016), with some minor 
alterations. The experiment includes two treatments, (1) the more or less game and (2) the 
dictator game. In the replication experiment, around 20 percent of participants choose less 
money over more in the more or less game.  
The second experiment elicits social norms from both the more or less game and the dictator 
game, using a clever elicitation method from Krupka and Weber (2013). The experiment 
reveals two important insights. First, social norms differ slightly between the two games, 
indicating that, in general, people perceive the games as two different situations. Second, 
social norms have a clear effect on behavior in the dictator game, while in the more or less 
game the effect is less clear.  
Even though the paper does not find a general effect of social norms on behavior in the more 
or less game, it does find that people’s perceptions of the social norm varies a lot. It could be 
possible that social norms affects some participant’s behavior in the more or less game, but to 
answer this specific question, further research is required. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 The surprising experiment 
The point of departure for this paper is a surprising finding from an economic experiment. 
Tjøtta (2016) designs a more or less game, where participants are asked to choose between 
receiving 450 kroner or 250 kroner, conditional on winning a lottery. There is no mention of 
what happens to foregone money if participants choose the alternative with less money, the 
choice does not affect the probability of winning the lottery, and the experiment is double 
blinded. In one treatment, participants also play a dictator game in addition to the more or less 
game. Surprisingly, almost one third of participants in the more or less game choose less 
money over more. There is also a high correlation between choosing less money in the more 
or less game and in the dictator game. How can this result be interpreted? 
Outside of the lab, people regularly engage in activities that are costly to themselves and 
mainly benefit others. People volunteer, vote, return lost wallets, give blood and donate to 
charities. This social behavior is also observed in lab experiments. People share in the dictator 
game, punish low offers in the ultimatum game, contribute to public goods and cooperate in 
prisoners dilemma games. When actions affect other people, many are willing to share, trust, 
cooperate or punish, even if it means less money for themselves.  
Observations of social behavior in both lab experiments and real world, have led to the 
development of social preference theories. They adapt the standard economic model by 
implementing preferences that go beyond people’s own monetary payoff, through concerns 
for altruism, fairness or equality. People trade off utility derived from higher monetary payoff 
against utility derived from achieving altruistic, fair or equal outcomes. In the dictator game, 
where choosing less money for yourself means more money for someone else, social 
preferences theories can explain behavior fairly well (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2000, Andreoni and Bernheim 2009).  
The fact that some participants choose less money over more, even when doing so does not 
affect anyone else, is what makes the result from the more or less game puzzling. The result is 
difficult to explain with simple social preferences models assuming preferences for certain 





1.2 Why do some people choose less money? 
Three possible explanations as to why people choose less money over more should be 
considered.  
First, it is possible that people misinterpret or misunderstand the experiment. Participants 
might believe they have a higher possibility of winning the lottery if they choose less money. 
Or they might assume that the decision they make in the more or less game, in some way 
affects decisions they have to make later in the experiment.  
Another possibility, is that participants see the more or less game as a variation of the dictator 
game. If participants perceive that the money they refrain from will be given back to the 
experimenter, the more or less game becomes a dictator game with the experimenter as 
recipient. If this is the case, participants who choose less money for themselves, might have 
social preferences that favor sharing with the experimenter.  
Lastly, it is possible that participants care about acting appropriate and in accordance with a 
social norm. In economics, social norms have started to receive attention when it comes to 
explaining social behavior (Krupka and Weber 2013, Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2016). A 
complementary approach to simple social preferences theories, is that people have preferences 
for acting in accordance with social norms, rather than preferences for certain altruistic, fair or 
equal outcomes. The social norm approach is concerned with the appropriateness of actions, 
rather than outcomes. If a social norm suggests that choosing more money in the more or less 
game is inappropriate behavior, that can potentially explain why some people choose less 
money over more. 
1.3 Purpose  
The purpose of this paper is to examine what effect social norms might have on behavior in 
both the more or less game and the dictator game. Two questions are examined. First, are 
there different social norms affecting behavior in the more or less game and dictator game, or 
do people interpret them as the same situation? Second, can a preference for following a 
social norm explain why some people choose less money over more in the more or less game? 
Understanding what motivates choosing less money over more in the more or less game, can 
lead to a better understanding of social behavior such as sharing, reciprocity, cooperation, 
contribution to public goods and costly punishment. If neither simple social preference 
models, nor the social norms approach can account for the surprising result in the more or less 




1.4 Method  
To examine the two main questions of the paper, two economic experiments are conducted. 
The first experiment replicates the more or less game from Tjøtta (2016), to check the 
robustness of the findings. The experiment includes two treatments, the more or less game (1) 
and the dictator game (2). A between-subject design is used, where participants face either the 
more or less game or the dictator game.  
The second experiment elicits social norms from the more or less game and the dictator game, 
using a clever experimental design from Krupka and Weber (2013). Participants see 
descriptions of different hypothetical situations1 in which a person face a choice among 
several possible alternatives. For each situation, participants are asked to evaluate the social 
appropriateness of all available actions for the decision maker. To reveal the social norm, the 
experiment is designed as a coordination game, where participants are incentivized to match 
the responses of others. At the end of the experiment, a random action is drawn, and if a 
participant’s response to the action is the same as the modal response, the participant receives 
an extra payment.   
In the analysis of the results, elicited social norms from the more or less game and dictator 
game are compared, to examine if people interpret the two situations differently. Next, the 
elicited social norms are included as a component of utility in a conditional logit choice 
model, to predict behavior in the two games, and to examine if the model can explain why 
some people choose less money over more in the more or less game. 
1.5 Structure  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 deals with the replication of the more 
or less experiment. The original experiment from Tjøtta (2016) is described in more detail, 
before experimental design of the replication experiment is discussed. The chapter ends with a 
presentation of the results from the replication experiment.  
Chapter 3 deals with the social norm elicitation experiment. The chapter starts with an 
overview of social preference theories, before a social preference theory for following a social 
norm is presented. Next, experimental design from the norm elicitation experiment is 
discussed, before results are presented and analyzed. 
                                                          




Chapter 4 summarizes and discusses the results. Main findings are presented and potential 
weaknesses of the method and analysis are highlighted. The chapter ends with a look at a 








Chapter 2 – Replicating the more or less experiment 
 
2.1 The more or less experiment from Tjøtta (2016) – An overview 
Tjøtta (2016) conducted seven different variations of the more or less game, with more than 
3500 participants in total. The first four more or less games were conducted as classroom 
experiments, the fifth was conducted as a lab experiment and the sixth and seventh were 
conducted using web-based surveys (Ivarsflaten, Andersson et al. 2015). Participants were 
paid real money and the experiments were double blinded. The more or less question was 
framed as follows:  
 
Two persons in the auditorium will be randomly drawn to receive money. If you are one of 
those two persons, you can decide whether you will receive 250 kroner or 450 kroner. You 
can only mark one of the options. If you mark two or none, you will receive 0 kr. Mark your 
choice: 
I will accept 450 kroner, thank you.   
I will accept 250 kroner, thank you.  
 
In the first experiment, participants faced both the more or less game and a binary dictator 
game2, in randomized order. In the second experiment, participants faced either the more or 
less game or the dictator game. 31.9 percent of participants chose less money over more in the 
more or less experiments. 
To examine if having experience from similar economic experiments makes people more 
likely to accept money, Tjøtta (2016) conducted two more classroom experiments with both 
inexperienced and experienced participants. In the two experiments, 30.4 percent of 
participants chose less money, and neither experience from experiments or number of 
semesters studied, seemed to affect the tendency to accept less money over more.  
The fifth experiment examined if a stronger entitlement to the money would make people 
more likely to accept more money. Participants volunteered to a lab experiment and received 
                                                          
2 In the binary dictator game, dictators were asked to split 500 kroner between themselves and a recipient. The 




a show-up fee of 100 kroner. They were informed that 10 participants in each session would 
be drawn to win 500 kroner, and the more or less question was framed as how much money 
do you want to keep for yourself. Participants could freely choose how much money to keep. 
The more or less question came after repeated prisoner’s dilemma game lasting around 35 
minutes. In this experiment, 64.5 percent of participants chose less money over more. On 
average, participants kept 71.3 percent of the money they were endowed.  
The sixth and seventh experiments were conducted using web-based surveys (Ivarsflaten, 
Andersson et al. 2015). Experiment six asked participants to explain their choices. Among 
those who chose less money, 42.1 percent stated non-distributive norms as explanations, 
while 26.1 percent stated concern for distributive norms. 12.1 percent had misunderstood or 
misinterpreted the experiment.   
Experiment seven asked participants to reflect on the decision before making it. Reflection in 
combination with experience surprisingly caused an increase in the tendency to accept less 
money.  
Table 1 below, summarizes the seven different variations of the more or less game from 
Tjøtta (2016). 
Table 1 – Summary of the more or less experiment 
Experiment N Type Treatments Less money  
1 91 Classroom More/less + dictator (Within subject) 28.6% 
2 151 Classroom More/less + dictator (Between subject) 36.0% 
3 78 Classroom Experience vs inexperience 30.4% 
4 104 Classroom Experience vs inexperience 30.4% 
5 200 Lab Strengthening entitlements 64.5% 
6 1019 Web-based survey Explaining their choices  22.6% 
7 1861 Web-based survey Reflection 29.2% 
 
Main findings  
Two important findings stand out. In the more or less game, around one third of participants 
chose less money over more, in classroom experiments, lab experiments and in web-based 





Second, there was a strong correlation between choosing less money in the dictator game and 
in the more or less game. Of participants that faced both the more or less game and the 
dictator game, 59.3 percent gave away the same amount in both games (Tjøtta 2016). That 
people choose less money over more, even when doing so does not affect anyone else, is what 
makes the result from the more or less game puzzling. 
To check the robustness of the results from the original more or less experiment from Tjøtta 
(2016), a replication experiment is included in this paper. Experimental design and results 
from the replication experiment are presented in the next two sections.  
2.2 Experimental design – Replication of the more or less experiment 
The experiment include two treatments: The more or less game (1) and the dictator game (2).  
The experiment deviates from the one in Tjøtta (2016) in three ways. In the original 
experiment, participants choose between more money (450 kroner) and less money (250 
kroner), but there is no explicit alternative to choose no money3. To gain a better 
understanding of what motivates choosing less money over more, the experiment includes 
five alternatives in both treatments. The alternatives are: 800 kroner, 600 kroner, 400 kroner, 
200 kroner or 0 kroner.  
Second, the original experiment is framed as receiving money from a lottery, where 
participants have to choose how much money to accept. In order to minimize the difference 
between the more or less game and the dictator game, both treatments are framed as keeping 
money, conditional on winning a lottery.  
Third, the original experiment uses a within-subject design when comparing behavior in the 
dictator game and the more or less game. In the replication experiment, a between-subject 
design is used, where it is not possible to examine correlation in individual behavior between 
the two treatments.  
Lab or classroom experiment? 
The experiment was conducted as a lab experiment. The University of Bergen have access to 
a lab facility, The citizen lab. The lab experiment offered more anonymity, as partition walls 
separate seats in the lab. It also made it easier to control the number of participants in each 
session, and made it possible to run experiments with a longer duration.  
                                                          
3  Even though there is no explicit alternative to keep 0 NOK, the participants in Tjøtta (2016) do have the 




Within-subject or between-subject design? 
A within-subject design, where each participant face both the more or less game and the 
dictator game, would give more observations and make it possible to compare individual 
behavior in the two treatments. On the other hand, a within-subject design might lead to 
carryover effects and experimenter demand effects. If decisions made in one treatment affect 
decisions in the other treatment, there is a carryover effect. If participants can identify the 
research objective of the experiment, they might want to help the experimenter by giving the 
correct response. This is known as an experimenter demand effect (Zizzo 2010). Given the 
similarities between the two treatments, carryover and experimenter demand effects could be 
present with a within-subject design. In order to avoid such effects, a between subject design 
was preferred.  
That being said, the experiment was conducted together with a different dictator experiment. 
Even though participants only faced either the more or less game or the dictator game, they 
did also face a different variation of the dictator game. The other dictator game examined 
framing effects on giving in dictator games, and did not resemble the more or less game4.  
General instructions  
All participants received general written instructions before the experiment. The instructions 
included short information on the experiment and questions about gender, studies and 
experience from other experiments. The experiment was conducted in Norwegian. Appendix 
B includes instructions in Norwegian and an English translation.  
Treatment instructions 
Instructions in the two treatments were designed to be as similar as possible. In both 
treatments, participants were informed that a person would be drawn to receive 800 kroner. In 
the dictator game, participants had to decide how much money to keep, and were explicitly 
informed that the money they did not keep for themselves would be given to another 
participant. In the more or less game, participants were not given any information on what 
would happen to foregone money. The two games were presented to participants in the 
following way5. See appendix B for instructions in Norwegian. 
                                                          
4 The other dictator game experiment was conducted by Oda Sund, and will be used in her master’s thesis 
5 The experiment was conducted in Norwegian, instructions presented on the next page have been translated 




Treatment 1 – Dictator game 
Person A is drawn to receive 800 kroner. If you are drawn to be person A you have to make a 
decision in advance, on how much money you want to keep. The money you do not keep for 
yourself will be given to a randomly drawn person, person B. You can choose between 
keeping 800 kroner, 600 kroner, 400 kroner, 200 kroner or 0 kroner. 
 
 
I choose to keep:  Your 
answer 
Keep 800 kr 
(800 kr for you, 0 kr for person B) 
 
Keep 600 kr 
(600 kr for you, 200 kr for person B) 
 
Keep 400 kr 
(400 kr for you, 400 kr for person B) 
 
Keep 200 kr 
(200 kr for you, 600 kr for person B) 
 
Keep 0 kr 
(0 kr for you, 800 kr for person B) 
 
 
Treatment 2 – More or less question 
Person A is drawn to receive 800 kroner. If you are drawn to be person A you have to make a 
decision in advance, on how much money you want to keep. You can choose between keeping 
800 kroner, 600 kroner, 400 kroner, 200 kroner or 0 kroner. 
 
 
I choose to keep:  Your 
answer 
Keep 800 kr 
(800 kr) 
 
Keep 600 kr 
(600 kr) 
 
Keep 400 kr 
(400 kr) 
 
Keep 200 kr 
(200 kr) 
 













In order to avoid participants selecting into one of the treatments, participants were randomly 
assigned to either the dictator treatment or the more or less treatment. Before the experiment, 
a random number generator6 was used to decide the order of the sheets handed out. 
Additionally, participants drew a number from a bowl when entering the lab, assigning them 
to a specific seat.  
Payments 
Participants received a show-up fee of 50 kroner. To limit costs of the experiment, a lottery 
decided which participants would have their decisions realized. Participants were clearly 
informed about this in the written instructions. The experiment consisted of four sessions, 
where two participants in each session were drawn as winners of the lottery.   
That payments in both treatments are conditional on winning the lottery leads to weaker 
monetary incentives. In a meta-study on dictator games, Engel (2011) finds that uncertainty 
about whether the decision of the dictator becomes effective, leads to a negative effect on 
sharing. One way to interpret this finding, is that weaker monetary incentives make acting 
kind or fair relatively cheaper. If participants perceive the more or less game as a dictator 
game with the experimenter as recipient, the weaker monetary incentives could make giving 
money back to the experimenter more desirable. On the other hand, if participants perceive 
the more or less game simply as a choice between more or less money, weaker monetary 
incentives should not have an effect.  
Experimental procedure  
The experiment was conducted together with another dictator game experiment7, in the 
Citizen Lab at the University of Bergen, on the 28.febuary 2017. The experiment consisted of 
four sessions, with a total of 117 participants. 58 participants faced the more or less game, 
while 59 participants faced the dictator game. One participant in the more or less game gave a 
blank answer, and one participant in the dictator game failed to give a meaningful answer.  
We recruited participants using the software Hroot8, which is a database where volunteers can 
sign up to receive invitations to economic experiments. The database consists mainly of 
                                                          
6 https://www.random.org 





students from different faculties at the University of Bergen. Around 900 potential 
participants were invited through email, and could register for the experiment through a 
webpage. Each participant were only allowed to register for one session.   
In the invitation email9, participants were informed about time, place, financing of the 
experiment, that the experiment was anonymous and that it did not require any prior 
knowledge to participate. They were also informed that the experiment had an expected 
duration of 15 minutes, and that they would receive a show-up fee of 50 kroner, with the 
possibility to earn more based on the answers they would give in the experiment. 
In the days leading up to the experiment, reminder emails were sent out to invited participants 
who had not yet replied. The day before the experiment, registered participants received an 
email with information about the experiment. We received a few questions regarding what 
participants were expected to do in the experiment, and a few cancelations. We also received 
feedback from some participants who were uncertain about when their sessions started. 
Because of this, an additional reminder email were sent out, clearly specifying time and place 
of the experiment. 
On the day of the experiment, we had booked the lab, a control room and a waiting room. 
When participants arrived at the lab they were met by either a lab-assistant or an 
experimenter, who registered them and showed them to the waiting room. When all 
participants had arrived, they drew a letter from a bowl, which assigned them to their seat in 
the lab. This letter also worked as participant-id.  
The experiment was conducted using pen and paper. Sheets containing instructions and the 
experiment were placed on each seat before the participants entered the lab. 
When participants had entered the lab and found their seats, an experimenter gave 
instructions. The participants were informed about who conducted and financed the 
experiment, about the expected duration of the experiment and that it would be impossible for 
both the experimenters and other participants to identify answers they would give in the 
experiment. They were also asked not to communicate with each other during the experiment. 
An experimenter was available in the lab throughout the whole experiment to answer potential 
questions. This experimenter was located at a desk in the front corner of the lab, with no 
possibility to see participants, unless they raised a hand for questions.  
                                                          




A lab assistant and an experimenter were located in the control room during the experiment, 
where they drew winners of the lottery and distributed payoffs into envelopes. After the 
experiment, envelopes with payoffs were given to the experimenter in the lab, who then 
handed them out to the participants. This secured double blindness of the experiment.   
Three people were involved in conducting the experiment. Two experimenters and one lab-
assistant. One experimenter was responsible for instructions in the lab, answering potential 
questions and handing out envelopes with payoff to the participants. The other experimenter 
and the lab-assistant were responsible for welcoming and registering participants, drawing 
winners and distributing payoffs into envelopes. These two had no contact with the 
participants in the lab after the experiment had started.  
The four sessions had an average duration of about 12-15 minutes, with the experiment itself 
taking between 3-5 minutes. We had no issues while conducting the experiment.  
2.3 Results – Replication of the more or less experiment 
Figure 1 and Figure 2, show results from the two different treatments in the experiment, the 




Figure 1 – Results dictator game 
 
Figure 2 – Results more or less game 
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In the dictator game, the most common response was to keep half the money, and share half 
with the other participant. Around 25 percent of participants kept all the money for 
themselves, and only one participant kept less than half. This result is consistent with the 
experimental evidence from other dictator games (Engel 2011). 
In the more or less game, the most common response was to keep all the money. Around 19 
percent of participants kept less, either by choosing 600 kroner or 400 kroner, and no 
participants kept less than half. The results are similar to the ones reported in Tjøtta (2016). 
The surprising finding that some people choose less money in the more or less game is still 
present, but to a smaller degree. 
The smaller share of participants choosing less money, could potentially be explained by an 
entitlement effect from framing the more or less game as keeping money. If participants 
perceive the money as their own, it might be more acceptable to keep it. In dictator games 
where dictators have had to earn the money they are to distribute, dictators keep significantly 
more for themselves (Cherry, Frykblom et al. 2002). In his meta study, Engel (2011) finds 
that framing the dictator game so that the dictator feels entitled to the money, leads to a small 
and weakly significant effect on keeping money.   
The main difference between the two treatments is that participants keep significantly more 
money in the more or less treatment than in the dictator treatment. Without an explicit 





Chapter 3 – Social norms in the more or less game and dictator 
game 
 
3.1 Social preference theories and social norms  
A common assumption in standard economic theory has been that people are narrowly self-
interested. When faced with a decision-making problem, people will maximize their own 
monetary payoff without concern for other people’s payoff or for social goals. 
In the 1980s, observations from the ultimatum game (Guth, Schmittberger et al. 1982) 
questioned the self-interest assumption. The ultimatum game is a two-stage economic 
decision making game that investigate ultimatum bargaining situations. Players are assigned 
in random pairs where one player is given the role as proposer, the other as responder. In the 
first stage, the proposer receives an endowment and makes a proposal on how to spilt the 
endowment between himself and the responder. In the second stage, the responder either 
accepts or rejects the proposal. If accepted, the endowment is split according to the proposal. 
If rejected, both players get nothing.  
According to game theory, the proposer should maximize his earnings by proposing a split 
where the responder receives an amount that is marginally larger than zero. The responder 
should accept any proposal larger than zero.  
The typical finding from the ultimatum game, deviates from the predicted behavior of 
standard economic theory. Proposers usually offer to share between 25-50 percent of the 
endowment with the responder, and offers below 5 percent are rare. Responders frequently 
reject offers below 20 percent (Roth 1995).   
To further explore the findings from the ultimatum game, a modified version of the game was 
designed, the dictator game (Kahneman, Knetsch et al. 1986, Forsythe, Horowitz et al. 1994). 
In the dictator game, the responder’s ability to reject the proposal is removed. Players are 
assigned into random pairs, where one player is given the role as dictator, the other as 
recipient. The dictator receives an endowment, and decides how to spilt the endowment 
between himself and the recipient. The recipient has no choice but to accept the proposed 
split, so that the dictator has no strategic concerns when making his decision.  
Removing strategic concerns from the ultimatum game, reduces the amount shared with the 




endowment, and only about 36 percent of dictators take everything for themselves (Engel 
2011).  
To explain why some people share with the recipient, even though it means less money for 
themselves, social preference theories were developed. They argue that people have 
preferences that go beyond maximizing their own payoff, through concerns for altruism, 
fairness, reciprocity or equality (Levine 1998, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 
2000, Charness and Rabin 2002).  
Social preference theories assume that people’s utility depends both on their own monetary 
payoff, but also on the monetary payoff of a reference group of others. People have certain, 
exogenously given, preferences for altruistic, fair or equal outcomes, and could be willing to 
sacrifice monetary payoff to achieve these outcomes.  
Simple social preferences models can successfully explain behavior in many variations of the 
ultimatum game and the dictator game, and are currently the leading theory when it comes to 
explaining social behavior in economics.  
Despite the success of the social preferences models, there are still some observations from 
lab experiments that are difficult to explain using the simple models. Small changes to choice 
context and framing of an experiment can cause significant changes to outcome. Dictator 
games where participants take from, instead of give to an anonymous recipient, results in 
people leaving more money for the recipient (List 2007, Bardsley 2008). If people have a 
preference for a certain social outcome, it should not matter whether this outcome is achieved 
by taking money or giving money.   
Other examples include dictator games where the degree of anonymity and sense of 
entitlement to the money affect dictator giving (Hoffman, Mccabe et al. 1994) (Cherry, 
Frykblom et al. 2002), and prisoner’s dilemma games where the name of the game leads to 
different levels of cooperation10 (Liberman, Samuels et al. 2004). 
The more or less game from Tjøtta (2016) is also difficult to explain using simple social 
preferences models. When there are no outcomes that can be considered altruistic, fair or 
equal, why do some people choose less money over more?  
                                                          
10 When the game is called “Community game”, levels of cooperation are significantly higher than when the 




A social preference theory for following social norms 
To explain both the existence and the dynamics of social behavior, a complementary approach 
to the simple social preference models has been suggested. The approach argue that people 
care about acting appropriate and in accordance with social norms. Social behavior is not 
driven directly by preferences for altruistic, fair or equal payoff distributions, but indirectly by 
preferences for following social norms, see for example Krupka and Weber (2013) and 
Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2016). Heterogeneity in observed social behavior across 
different variations of experiments, can then be explained by the fact that social norms vary 
with context. To give money in a dictator game will probably be considered appropriate 
behavior in accordance with the social norm, while taking money might be considered 
inappropriate. Can this approach explain behavior in the more or less game?    
3.2 Definition of a social norm 
When examining the effect of a social norm on behavior, it is necessary to define what a 
social norm is. Several definitions exist in the literature, but two distinct features are usually 
present. First, social norms normally apply to actions or behavior rather than outcomes. Elster 
(1989) distinguishes between rational action which is outcome oriented, and social norms 
which are not. Rational action says that if you want to achieve outcome Y, do action X. Social 
norms on the other hand, say that you should do action X, or you should not do action Z.  
When it comes to social norms, the appropriateness of two different actions producing the 
same outcome might be considered very differently. Taking money from someone to achieve 
equality might be considered inappropriate, while giving money to achieve the same equal 
outcome might be considered appropriate. When it comes to rational action, outcome is the 
variable of interest. If an equal outcome is preferred, it does not matter if achieving the equal 
outcome is done by taking or by giving.    
Second, for a norm to be social, it must be jointly recognized in a population or group. 
According to Ostrom (2000), social norms are shared understandings about actions that are 
obligatory, permitted, or forbidden. 
Additionally, it is common to distinguish between injunctive social norms and descriptive 
social norms. Injunctive norms describe what people ought to do. Descriptive norms describe 
actions that people regularly take, and is closely related to customs or conventions. Both 
injunctive and descriptive social norms might affect behavior, but the focus in this paper is on 




Finally, it is important to note that if an action is considered the most appropriate action in a 
given situation, it does not necessarily make all other actions inappropriate. If the social norm 
is tipping 20 percent after having dinner at a restaurant, tipping 10 percent or 30 percent does 
not automatically become inappropriate. Other actions can still be considered appropriate, just 
less appropriate than the norm.   
When do people conform to social norms? 
Bicchieri (2006) argues that people conform to a social norm when they believe that both 
most others conform to the norm, and most others expect them to conform to the norm. In this 
view, if a social norm is to affect behavior, people should share a belief that others are 
conforming to the norm, together with a belief that they are themselves expected to follow the 
norm.  
The definition of a social norm used in this paper can be summarized as:  
A shared understanding in a group or population, of what constitutes appropriate behavior, 
or appropriate action, in a given situation. 
3.3 Eliciting social norms through an economic experiment  
To elicit social norms that might affect behavior in the more or less game and dictator game, a 
clever elicitation method developed by Krupka and Weber (2013) can be used. Participants 
are presented with descriptions of different hypothetical situations in which a person face a 
choice among several possible alternatives. For each situation, participants are asked to 
evaluate the social appropriateness of all available actions for the decision maker. The 
evaluation is done on the following scale11:  
Very socially inappropriate (-1) – Somewhat socially inappropriate (-1/3) – Somewhat 
socially appropriate (1/3) - Very socially appropriate (1) 
To reveal the social norm, the experiment is designed as a coordination game, where 
participants are incentivized to match the response of others, instead of revealing their own 
personal preferences. The incentive is created by drawing a random action at the end of the 
experiment, and if a participant’s response to the action is the same as the modal response, the 
participant receives an extra payment. Participants are thus incentivized to reveal how they 
believe most others would evaluate the appropriateness of different actions. 
                                                          




For example, in a dictator game, if the randomly drawn action is “Give everything to the 
recipient”, and the most frequently given response to this action is “Very socially 
appropriate”, all participants who have given this response will receive an extra payment. 
Participants who have given other responses will not receive the extra payment.  
From the coordination game, it is possible to elicit a norm profile that shows the mean 
appropriateness ratings of all available actions in a situation. The norm profile can be used to 
say whether or not there is a clear and well defined social norm in the situation, and what 
behavior would be considered in accordance with such a norm. To examine if social norms 
differ between the situations, elicited norm profiles can be compared. 
Furthermore, it is also possible to include the elicited norm profile as a component of utility in 
a conditional logit choice model. The model can be used to predict behavior in situations 
where social norms might affect behavior. 
3.4 Including a preference for following social norms in a simple utility 
framework 
A social preference model that includes a preference for following social norms can be 
modeled as follows. The model is from Krupka and Weber (2013). 
If 𝐴 = (𝑎1, 𝑎2 … … 𝑎𝑘) represents a set of 𝑘 available actions in a situation, it is possible to 
define a social norm in the situation as: 𝑁(𝑎𝑘) ∈ [−1, 1]. The social norm is a shared 
understanding of the degree of appropriateness for each available action in the situation. The 
elicited norm profile from the coordination game described above, which consists of mean 
appropriateness ratings for all available actions, can be used as an estimate for 𝑁(𝑎𝑘).  
If an action 𝑘 is considered appropriate then: 𝑁(𝑎𝑘) > 0. If an action 𝑘 is considered 
inappropriate then: 𝑁(𝑎𝑘) < 0. This definition of a social norm also allows for two 
appropriate (or inappropriate) actions to differ. Consider two actions 𝑙 and 𝑚. Both actions 
are considered appropriate so that: 𝑁(𝑎𝑙) > 0 and 𝑁(𝑎𝑚) > 0. If action 𝑙 is considered more 
appropriate than action 𝑚, then: 𝑁(𝑎𝑙) > 𝑁(𝑎𝑚) > 0.  
Assume that people have preferences both for the monetary payoff produced by an action and 
whether the action is considered socially appropriate and in accordance with the social norm. 
A utility function that defines the utility derived from an action is:  
 




𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑘) = Utility from action k 
𝑉 = Weight put on monetary payoff 
𝜋(𝑎𝑘) = Monetary payoff from action k 
𝛾 = Weight put on acting in accordance with the social norm 
𝑁(𝑎𝑘) = The appropriateness of action k (The social norm) 
 
In this simple framework, people will choose the utility maximizing action  𝑎𝑘
∗ , out of 𝐴 
possible actions. Different actions produce different utility, depending on the monetary payoff 
they produce, 𝜋(𝑎𝑘), whether the action is appropriate, 𝑁(𝑎𝑘) and the weights put on 
monetary payoff (𝑉) and acting in accordance with the norm (𝛾).  
If someone does not care about adhering to social norms, then 𝛾 = 0 and they will choose the 
action that maximize monetary payoff.  
In a situation with no well-defined social norm affecting behavior, values for 𝑁(𝑎𝑘) will be 
similar for all actions. For example, if all available actions in a situation are considered “Very 
socially appropriate”, then 𝑁(𝑎𝑘) = 1 for all k actions. When 𝑁(𝑎𝑘) take on the same value 
for all actions, utility will be maximized by choosing the action that produce the highest 
monetary payoff12.  
In situations where actions differ in social appropriateness, it is not given that people will 
choose the action that produces the highest monetary payoff. Instead, they will trade off utility 
derived from monetary payoff and utility derived from adhering to the social norm.  
The value of 𝛾 can differ from person to person, and explains heterogeneity in behavior 
within situations where there is a well-defined social norm. The value of 𝑉 allow individuals 
to put a greater weight on monetary payoff when stakes are high. It seems reasonable to 
assume that the higher the stakes, the higher the weight on monetary payoff.  
                                                          




The next section describes the experimental design in the norm elicitation experiment, which 
was used to obtain estimates for the social norms, 𝑁(𝑎𝑘), in the more or less game and 
dictator game. 
3.5 Experimental design – Norm elicitation experiment 
The objective of the norm elicitation experiment was to identify social norms related to the 
more or less game and the dictator game. Participants were presented with two hypothetical 
situations, one describing the more or less game, the other describing the dictator game.  
Within subject or between subject design? 
The experiment was conducted twice, once as a lab experiment and once as a classroom 
experiment. The lab experiment used a within-subject design where each participant evaluated 
both the more or less game and the dictator game. The design gives more observations per 
participant and reduces error variance associated with individual differences. On the other 
hand, the design might lead to carryover effects and experimenter demand effects. 
In order to control the results from the lab experiment for carryover and experimenter demand 
effects, the classroom experiment used a between-subject design, where participants only 
evaluated one situation. In the results section of this chapter, results from both the lab 
experiment and the classroom experiment are presented, together with a short discussion on 
differences between the results.  
General instructions  
All participants received general written instructions. They received short information on the 
experiment and were asked about gender, studies and experience from other experiments. 
Participants in both lab and classroom experiments received the same instructions. The 
experiments were conducted in Norwegian. Appendix B includes instructions in Norwegian 
and an English translation.  
Treatment instructions 
The experiment included two treatments. Evaluation of the more or less game (1) and 
evaluation of the dictator game (2). As in the replication of the more or less experiment, 
instructions in the two treatments were designed to be as similar as possible, with the 




Situations were presented in the same way in both lab and classroom experiments. In the lab 
experiment participants evaluated a total of five different hypothetical situations, including 
both the dictator game and the more or less game. In the classroom experiment, participants 
only evaluated one situation, either the dictator game or the more or less game. The 
hypothetical situations for eliciting social norms in the two treatments were presented to 
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Treatment 1 – Eliciting norms dictator game 
Assume that Person A takes part in a lottery to win 800 kr. In advance, Person A will have to 
make a decision on how much money to keep. The money that is not kept, will be given to a 
randomly drawn person, Person B. Person A can choose to keep 800 kroner, 600 kroner, 400 
kroner, 200 kroner or 0 kroner. 
 
The table below shows all available actions for Person A. Please indicate how socially 
appropriate each of the five actions are. Remember that if your evaluation of a randomly 
drawn action matches the most frequently given response, you have a chance to win 500 
kroner. Please mark your answers.  
 
 
Person A’s alternatives 








Very socially  
appropriate 
Keep 800 
(800 kr for A, 0 kr for B) 
    
Keep 600 
(600 kr for A, 200 kr for B) 
    
Keep 400 
(400 kr for A, 400 kr for B ) 
    
Keep 200 
(200 kr for A, 600 kr for B) 
    
Keep 0 
(0 kr for A, 800 kr for B) 
    
 
Treatment 2 – Eliciting norms in the more or less game 
Assume that Person A takes part in a lottery to win 800 kr. In advance, Person A will have to 
make a decision on how much money to keep. Person A can choose to keep 800 kroner, 600 
kroner, 400 kroner, 200 kroner or 0 kroner. 
 
The table below shows all available actions for Person A. Please indicate how socially 
appropriate each of the five actions are. Remember that if your evaluation of a randomly 
drawn action matches the most frequently given response, you have a chance to win 500 




Person A’s alternatives 












    
Keep 600 
(600 kr) 
    
Keep 400 
(400 kr) 
    
Keep 200 
(200 kr) 
    
Keep 0 
(0 kr) 






In the lab experiment, all participants received a sheet with five hypothetical situations. For 
practical reasons the order of the situations was fixed, not randomized14. If there are carryover 
effects from evaluating one situation to another, the results might be skewed. In their norm 
elicitation experiment, Krupka and Weber (2013) present participants with several 
hypothetical situations in a fixed order, but not including more than one treatment from each 
game.  
In the classroom experiment, sheets were handed out in randomized order. Each sheet 
contained only one hypothetical situation. 
Payments 
In the lab experiment, participants received a show-up fee of 50 kroner. As noted in the 
instructions, they also had a possibility to win 500 kroner based on the evaluation they gave in 
the experiment. In the four sessions of the lab experiment, 12 participants that had matched 
the most frequently given response for a randomly drawn action, won 500 kroner. 
In the classroom experiment, participants did not receive a show-up fee. 10 participants that 
had matched the most frequently given response for a randomly drawn action, won 500 
kroner.  
Experimental procedure – Lab experiment (Within-subject) 
The experiment was conducted in the Citizen Lab at the University of Bergen, on the 
28.febuary 2017. The experiment was conducted together with another norm elicitation 
experiment15, and had a total of 120 participants. Participants evaluated both the more or less 
game and the dictator game. 
Recruitment to the norm elicitation lab experiment was done together with recruitment to the 
replication of the more or less experiment. Participants received the exact same invitations. 
See section on experimental procedure for the replication of the more or less experiment for 
details.  
                                                          
14 To completely randomize the order of the 5 situations, we would have needed 120 different variations of the 
experiment sheets.  




The experiment was conducted using pen and paper. When participants arrived at the lab they 
were met by either a lab-assistant or an experimenter, who registered them and showed them 
to the waiting room. When all participants had arrived, they drew a letter from a bowl, which 
assigned them to their seat in the lab. This letter also worked as participant-id.  
When participants had found their seats, an experimenter gave instructions. The participants 
were informed about who conducted and financed the experiment, about the expected 
duration of the experiment and that it would be impossible for both the experimenters and 
other participants to identify answers they would give in the experiment. They were also 
asked not to communicate with each other during the experiment.  
Similar to the replication of the more or less experiment, three people were involved in 
conducting the experiment. Two experimenters and one lab-assistant. One experimenter was 
responsible for instructions in the lab, answering potential questions and handing out 
envelopes with payoff to the participants. The other experimenter and the lab-assistant were 
responsible for welcoming and registering participants, drawing winners and distributing 
payoffs into envelopes. These two had no contact with the participants in the lab after the 
experiment had started.  
The four sessions of the norm elicitation experiment had an average total duration of 22-25 
minutes, where the experiment took about 9-10 minutes. We had no issues while conducting 
the experiment.  
Experimental procedure – Classroom experiment (Between-subject) 
The classroom experiment was conducted on the 30.march 2017, in a Statistics for marketing-
students lecture at BI Bergen. The experiment was conducted together with another norm 
elicitation experiment16, and had a total of 157 participants. 40 participants evaluated the more 
or less game, 39 participants evaluated the dictator game.  
Participants in the classroom experiment were not recruited beforehand. Students present at 
the lecture were offered a chance to participate in the experiment during the break between 
the first and second part of the lecture. Around 90 % of the students present at the lecture 
chose to participate.  
                                                          




The experiment was conducted using pen and paper. Sheets containing instructions and the 
experiment were handed out to participants at the start of the experiment. Before handing out 
instructions, participants were informed about who conducted and financed the experiment, 
the expected duration, anonymity and that they could earn real money depending on their 
answers. Participants were also asked not to communicate with each other during the 
experiment. 
We had 45 sheets with each treatment17, and both experimenters and the lecturer helped hand 
out the sheets. Participants then had 4 minutes to read instructions and finish the experiment. 
When finished, participants were asked to fold their sheets and hand them in. In total, the 
experiment lasted around 7 minutes. We had no issues while conducting the experiment.  
3.6 Results – Norm elicitation experiments 
Converting responses into numerical scores makes is possible to calculate the mean 
appropriateness rating for each available action in both the more or less game and the dictator 
game. A rating of “Very socially inappropriate” received a score of -1, “Somewhat socially 
inappropriate” a score of -1/3, “Somewhat socially appropriate” a score of 1/3 and “Very 
socially appropriate” a score of 1. Table 2 and Table 3 list mean appropriateness ratings from 
lab and classroom experiments. Tables also show the full distribution of responses, with the 
most frequently given responses marked in grey. To test if population means in the two 
treatments differ, Wilcoxan signed rank tests are reported for the lab experiment and 










                                                          




Table 2 - Elicited appropriateness ratings, lab experiment 
Lab experiment – Within-subject design 





-- - + ++  Mean -- - + ++ Signrank 
test (z) 
0kr  0.32 13% 18% 25% 43%  0.13 28% 16% 14% 41%     3.508∗∗∗ 
200kr  0.57 2% 12% 35% 51%  0.43 7% 22% 21% 50%    1.753∗    
400kr  0.93 0% 0% 11% 89%  0.66 5% 8% 19% 67%    4.860∗∗∗ 
600kr  0.27 3% 27% 47% 23%  0.57 8% 11% 20% 61% −4.590∗∗∗ 
800kr  -0.25 36% 32% 17% 16%  0.59 14% 5% 8% 72% −8.050∗∗∗ 
*** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.10. Signrank reports z-values and significance. 
Responses are: Very socially inappropriate (--), Socially inappropriate (-), Socially appropriate 
(+),Very socially appropriate (++).  
 
Table 3 - Elicited appropriateness ratings, classroom experiment 
Classroom experiment – Between subject design 





-- - + ++  Mean -- - + ++ Ranksum 
test (z) 
0kr  0.20 18% 23% 21% 38%  0.28 23% 15% 10% 53% −0.646    
200kr  0.50 3% 13% 41% 44%  0.58 3% 18% 20% 60% −0.959    
400kr  0.79 5% 0% 16% 79%  0.65 5% 3% 33% 60%    1.719∗   
600kr  0.23 3% 26% 56% 15%  0.55 5% 10% 33% 53% −3.021∗∗∗ 
800kr  -0.30 28% 49% 13% 10%  0.3 13% 25% 18% 45% −3.482∗∗∗ 
*** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.10. Ranksum reports z-values and significance. 
Responses are: Very socially inappropriate (--), Socially inappropriate (-), Socially appropriate 
(+),Very socially appropriate (++) 
 
Plotting mean appropriateness ratings in a figure, illustrates the elicited norm profile. Figure 3 
and Figure 4 compare norm profiles between the dictator game and the more or less game, 
based on ratings from the lab and classroom experiment. Standard errors and confidence 




Figure 3 - Norm profile, lab experiment 
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Discussion: Within- or between-subject design? 
In general, elicited norm profiles from lab and classroom experiments are similar. As can be 
seen from Table 2 and Table 3, the most frequently given response is the same for 9 out of 10 
actions, and the mean appropriateness rating for most actions are similar. Looking at the 
graphical representation of the elicited norm profiles in Figure 3 and Figure 4, the general 
trends are very similar, but there is a small difference in the norm profile for the more or less 
game.  
In the lab experiment, keeping more money generally leads to an increase in appropriateness 
rating, while in the classroom experiment the trend is flatter. In the classroom experiment, 
keeping all the money and keeping no money is actually considered equally appropriate.   
Using Wilcoxan rank sum tests to compare results from the experiments reveal more 
differences.  
Table 4 - Comparing lab and classroom results – More or less game 
Money 
kept 
Mean appropriateness  
Lab 






0kr 0.13 0.28 1,152 No 
200kr 0.43 0.58 1,167 No 
400kr 0.66 0.65 −1,191 No 
600kr 0.57 0.55 −1,182 No 
800kr 0.59 0.3  −2,712∗∗∗ Yes 
*** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.10. Ranksum reports z-value and significance 
 
Table 5 - Comparing lab and classroom results – Dictator game 
Money 
kept 
Mean appropriateness  
Lab 






0kr 0.32 0.20 −0.955 No 
200kr 0.57 0.50 −1.986∗∗∗ Yes 
400kr 0.93 0.79 −1.948∗∗ Yes 
600kr 0.27 0.23 −2.276∗∗∗ Yes 
800kr -0.25 -0.30 1.166 No 




In the more or less game, there is a significant difference in the evaluation of the alternative 
“keep 800.”  In the dictator game, there are significant differences in evaluation of the 
alternatives “keep 200” “keep 400” and “keep 600.”  
The differences could be coincidental, or due to the fact that the classroom experiment only 
has around 40 observations per action, while the lab experiment has 120 observations per 
action. Another possibility, is that results from the lab experiment are affected by carryover 
effects or experimenter demand effects.  
To avoid potential problems due to carryover and experimenter demand effects, data from the 
classroom experiment will be used in the analysis that follows. Robustness checks on data 
from the lab experiment are included in Appendix E.    
3.7 Analysis – Social norms in the more or less game and dictator game 
 
Do different social norms apply to the more or less game and the dictator game? 
Based on data reported in Table 3 and Figure 4, some general conclusions can be made. In the 
dictator game, a clear social norm defines keeping 400 kroner as the most appropriate action. 
The action has a mean appropriateness rating of 0,79 and 79 percent of participants evaluated 
the action as “Very socially appropriate.” Other actions are also considered appropriate, with 
the exception of keeping 800 kroner, which is considered somewhat inappropriate. Elicited 
appropriateness ratings fit well with experimental evidence from dictator games, where 
sharing half of the money with the recipient is a common response (Engel 2011).  
In the more or less game, the social norm is less clear. All actions are considered appropriate, 
with a mean appropriateness rating between 0,28 and 0,65. The most frequently given 
response is “Very socially appropriate” for all actions.  
Comparing the mean appropriateness ratings in the more or less game and the dictator game, 
show statistically significant differences in appropriateness ratings for actions keep 400, keep 
600 and keep 80018. In the more or less game, keeping 600 or 800 kroner are both considered 
more appropriate than in the dictator game, while keeping 400 is considered less appropriate. 
This fits well with actual behavior in the two games, where keeping 600 or 800 kroner is more 
common in the more or less game. Based on the elicited mean appropriateness ratings, social 
                                                          




norms in the two situations seems to be somewhat different. On the other hand, the results do 
not exclude the possibility that some participants perceive the two situations as the same.  
Predicting behavior using the simple utility framework 
To investigate how well the elicited social norms can predict behavior in the actual more or 
less game and dictator game, it is possible to use the simple utility framework presented 
earlier.  
𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑘) = 𝑉(𝜋𝑖(𝑎𝑘)) +  𝛾𝑁(𝑎𝑘) 
 
Estimating the equation can be done by using mean appropriateness ratings from the norm 
elicitation experiment, together with behavioral data from the replication of the more or less 
experiment. Following Krupka and Weber (2013), a conditional (fixed effect) logistic 
regression19 is used, where the binary dependent variable is whether an action was selected. 
The explanatory variables are characteristics of each action, in this case the monetary payoff 
an action produces (𝜋) and the mean appropriateness of the action (𝑁(𝑎𝑘)). By assuming that 
𝑉(𝜋) =  𝛽𝜋 for any final payoff for the decision maker, the conditional (fixed effects) logistic 
regression provides estimates for weights put on monetary payoff (𝛽) and adherence to social 
norms (𝛾). This leads to the following utility function:  
 
𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑘) = 𝛽𝜋𝑖(𝑎𝑘) +  𝛾𝑁(𝑎𝑘) 
 
Standard errors are bootstrapped (1000 reps), to account for noisy estimates of 𝑁(𝑎𝑘). Table 6 
reports the estimation results of two conditional (fixed effects) logistic regressions. In Model 
1, explanatory variables are monetary payoff produced by an action, and the actions mean 
appropriateness rating. In Model 2, an interaction term between mean appropriateness rating 
and a variable that indicates whether the participant faced the more or less game or the 
dictator game, is included in the model.  
                                                          
19 See McFadden, D. (1974). Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. Frontiers in Econometrics. 





Table 6 - Conditional (fixed effect) logistic regression  
Conditional (fixed-effect) logistic regression with behavioral data and elicited appropriateness 
ratings (from the classroom experiment) 
 Model Model 
Behavioral data (1) (2) 
   
Payoff (𝛽)     0.012***     0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Appropriateness rating (𝛾)     4.776***     3.781*** 
 (0.980) (0.983) 
Appropriateness rating X Treatment   -2.817* 
  (1.709) 
   
Log-likelihood -105.621 -104.319 
Observations 575 575 
Subjects 115 115 
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0. 01; all two-tailed. Bootstrapped standard errors (1000 reps) are in 
parentheses. Treatment = 1 if More or less, 0 if Dictator game 
 
Coefficients from the conditional logit estimation cannot be interpreted in the same way as 
coefficients from an OLS regression, but the sign and significance of each coefficient can give 
some insight. The coefficient for 𝛽 is positive and statistically significant in both models, 
indicating that people care about their own monetary payoff and that in general, more money 
is better than less. The coefficient for 𝛾 is also positive and statistically significant in both 
models, indicating that people care about the appropriateness of their behavior.  
It is also worth noting that the coefficient for appropriateness rating is large relative to the 
coefficient for monetary payoff. This could be explained by the fact that participants in the 
more or less experiment (behavioral data) choose between expected payoffs, not certain 
outcomes20. In a situation where there is uncertainty about the monetary payoff that an action 
produces, but not about the appropriateness of the action, adhering to the social norm 
becomes relatively cheaper. 
Krupka and Weber (2013) use the ratio 
2𝛾
𝛽
 to identify how much money an individual is 
willing to sacrifice to take an action that is considered very socially appropriate (+1), rather 
than very socially inappropriate (-1). Based on the coefficients from Model 2, the ratio is 840. 
The probability that a participant in the more or less experiment would win the lottery was on 
                                                          
20 A lottery decides which participants will have their decisions realized. See section: Experimental design – 




average 7 percent. An individual would thus be willing to sacrifice 59 kroner21 of certain 
monetary payoff to take an action that is considered very socially appropriate (+1), rather than 
very socially inappropriate (-1). In Krupka and Weber (2013), this ratio is 5,66 USD, which is 
approximately 50 kroner22  
In Model 2, the coefficient for the interaction term is negative and statistically significant at 
the 10 percent level. Including the interaction term also changes the other coefficients. This 
suggests that on average, people care differently about adhering to social norms in the two 
situations.  
Predictions 
By using coefficients from Model 2, it is possible to calculate predicted frequencies of choices 
in the two treatments, based on the probability that an individual would choose an action. 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 compares predicted frequencies to actual behavior in the more or less 
experiment.  
Figure 5 - Predicted frequencies, Dictator game 
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Figure 6 - Predicted frequencies, More or less game 
 
The model predicts behavior very well. In the dictator game, the most frequent outcome is to 
keep half the money, while in the more or less question the most frequent outcome is to keep 
all the money. The model also predicts that some people would choose less money in the 
more or less question.  
Considering that the model uses behavioral data from the experiments it is supposed to 
predict, the success of the model is perhaps not surprising. Appendix F includes predictions 
based on Model 1 in Table 6, and Model 1 and 2 in Table 6 using elicited norms from the lab 
experiment. All models predict behavior very well, which might indicate that the success of 
the model, at least partially, comes from using behavioral data from the experiment it is 
supposed to predict.   
Using only behavioral data from either the more or less game or the dictator game 
The interaction term in model (2) suggests that people care differently about social norms in 
the more or less game and dictator game. It can therefore be interesting to run the conditional 
(fixed effect) logistic regression (Model 1) with only behavioral data from either the more or 
less game or the dictator game. This can reveal more potential differences in the effect of 
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behavioral data from only the more or less game was used. In Model (4), behavioral data from 
only the dictator game was used. 
Table 7 - Conditional (fixed effect) logistic regression, behavioral data from either 
dictator game or more or less question 
Conditional (fixed-effect) logistic regression with behavioral data and elicited appropriateness 
ratings (from the classroom experiment) 
Behavioral data  More or less game Dictator game 
    
  Model (3) Model (4) 
    
Payoff (𝛽)            0.007***   0.010 
    (0.001)   (0.041) 
Appropriateness rating (𝛾)      -0.646  4.431 
    (1.571)  (14.873) 
    
Log-likelihood  -38.327 -65.606 
Observations  285 290 
Subjects  57 58 
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0. 01; all two-tailed. Bootstrapped standard errors (1000 reps) are in 
parentheses, In model (3), only 995 replications were completed.  
 
Using only behavioral data from the dictator game reveals coefficients that are very similar to 
the ones reported in model (1), but both coefficients are now insignificant. The insignificance 
could potentially be explained by the fact that the model now only uses observations from 58 
subjects instead of 115 subjects.      
When using only behavioral data from the more or less game, the coefficient for payoff is still 
positive and significant, while the coefficient for appropriateness rating becomes negative and 
insignificant. The result suggests that in the more or less game, participants mainly care about 
payoff maximization.  
Recall from the simple utility framework, that if the appropriateness 𝑁(𝑎𝑘) of all actions in a 
situation are similar, people will choose alternatives that maximize payoff. The elicited norm 
profile for the more or less game in Figure 4 is relatively flat, with only small differences in 
mean appropriateness rating between alternatives. This could explain why behavior in the 






Robustness – Using elicited norms form the lab experiment 
To check the robustness of the results in Table 7, Appendix E includes results from  
regressions of Model (3) and Model (4) using the elicited norms from the lab experiment, 
instead of the classroom experiment. Surprisingly, this leads to a large change in the 
coefficient for appropriateness rating in Model (3). Using elicited norms from the lab 
experiment yields a coefficient that is positive and significant at the 10 percent level, 
indicating that people in fact care about the appropriateness of their actions in the more or less 
game.   
Comparing the norm profile for the more or less game in Figure 3 (lab) to the one in Figure 4 
(classroom), can offer an explanation to the change in coefficients in Model (3) when social 
norms from the lab experiment is used. The norm profile from the lab experiment have an 
increasing trend, where mean appropriateness ratings generally increase with keeping more 
money. The trend in the norm profile from the classroom experiment is flatter. If there is a 
high correlation between payoff and appropriates rating, so that choosing more money gives 
both more payoff and a higher appropriateness rating, the model might not be able to separate 
















Chapter 4 – Summary and discussion  
 
4.1 Main findings  
The more or less experiment from Tjøtta (2016) was successfully replicated, and the 
surprising finding that some people choose less money over more, even when doing so does 
not affect anyone else, was present in the replication experiment. This provides a robustness 
check of the surprising experiment, and finds that the result is robust to adding more 
alternatives to the choice set.  
At the start of the paper, two main questions were asked.  
First, do social norms in the more or less game and dictator game differ, or are they 
interpreted as the same? The elicited norm profiles from the more or less game and dictator 
game show slightly different social norms in the two situations. The main difference is that 
keeping most of the money is considered more appropriate in the more or less game than in 
the dictator game. For actions keep 800, keep 600 and keep 400, there are statistically 
significant differences between the two situations. The finding is strengthened by the results 
from the conditional logit regression, where including the interaction term between 
appropriateness ratings and treatment, yields a significant coefficient. The finding suggests 
that, in general, people see the two games as two different situations, but it does not exclude 
the possibility that some participants might consider them the same.  
Second, can social norms explain why some people choose less money in the more or less 
game? In general, the conditional logit choice model predicts behavior well in both the more 
or less game and the dictator game, but the result might be affected by using behavioral data 
from the experiment the model is supposed to predict.  
Estimated coefficients from the conditional logit regressions, suggests that people care about 
both monetary payoff and acting appropriate, but differently in the dictator game and more or 
less game. In the dictator game, the coefficient for appropriateness rating is generally positive. 
This is consistent with Krupka and Weber (2013), who also finds a positive effect of 
appropriateness ratings on behavior in dictator games.   
In the more or less game, the coefficient for appropriateness rating becomes negative and 
insignificant when using only behavioral data from the more or less game, suggesting that 
acting appropriate might not be the main concern of participants. The fact that all actions in 




given response to all actions was “Very socially appropriate,” makes the general effect of 
social norms on behavior in the more or less game small.  
On the other hand, the simple model does not necessarily account for people having different 
perceptions of what the social norm is. In the model, elicited mean appropriateness ratings 
𝑁(𝑎𝑘) are used as an estimate for the social norm. The mean appropriateness rating describes 
the average appropriateness of each action, but does not say anything about how perceptions 
of the norm vary around the average.  
Table 3, that show the full distribution of responses given in the norm elicitation experiment, 
reveal that there is a significant amount of heterogeneity in people’s perception of the social 
norm, both in the dictator game and the more or less game. Knowing that the more or less 
game have little resemblance with situations faced in everyday life, it is not surprising that 
people have different perceptions of what would be considered appropriate behavior. Even 
though coefficients from the conditional logit regression does not show a general effect of 
social norms on behavior in the more or less game, they do not exclude the possibility that 
social norms might have an effect for some participants. To answer this specific question, 
further research is required. 
4.2 Weaknesses with experimental design  
It has been pointed out, see for example Levitt and List (2007), Smith (2010), that even in 
controlled lab experiments, it will never be possible to control everything. One important 
factor that can be difficult to control, is experiences and beliefs brought into the lab by 
participants. Some people might have participated in dictator experiments or other similar 
experiments before, and thereby bring with them certain beliefs and expectations on how to 
behave or how to interpret the questions they are asked.  
The more or less game, which is an unfamiliar situation for most people, could be especially 
vulnerable to different interpretations from participants. The fact that there is no mention of 
what happens to foregone money in the experiment, does not mean that participants will not 
make assumptions of what happens to the money. Some might perceive the game as a dictator 
game, while others might perceive it as a choice between more or less money. This can make 
an impact on both the actual more or less game, and the norm elicitation experiment.  
Participants could also assume that the decision they make in the more or less game will have 




the experiment. When analyzing data from the experiments, one should be aware of these 
potential effects.    
Additionally, as pointed out earlier, carryover effects and experimenter demand effects might 
affect results in experiments using a within-subject design. In the replication experiment, as 
well as in the norm elicitation experiment, participants faced either the dictator game or the 
more or less game, but they also faced another version of the dictator game from the other 
experiment. There is a possibility that this could have led to a carryover effect, which should 
also be considered when analyzing the data.    
4.3 Weaknesses with the conditional logit choice model  
Some potential problems with the conditional logit choice model could also be pointed out. 
First, if for all alternatives, choosing more money would equal both more payoff and more 
appropriateness, the model might fail to separate the effects of payoff and appropriateness.  
Second, participants in the experiments might be concerned with more than the payoff and 
appropriateness of an action. The size of the stakes, the degree of scrutiny from others, and 
private moral considerations (Levitt and List 2007) might also have an effect on behavior, 
which the model does not account for.   
Third, the model use elicited mean appropriates ratings, 𝑁(𝑎𝑘), as an estimate for the social 
norm. As pointed out earlier, mean appropriateness ratings might be an inaccurate estimate, 
and does not necessarily account for heterogeneity in perceptions of the social norm. 
Coefficients from the model only show the effect of the average social norm on behavior, but 
could miss out on effects from different individual perceptions of the norm.  
4.4 Suggestion for further research – A different view on social norms 
The model used in this paper, assume that people derive utility from acting appropriate and 
following social norms, and disutility from breaking social norms. A different interpretation, 
inspired by Adam Smith and his Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith 1759), suggest that the 
decision to act in accordance with a social norm, does not come directly from a utility 
calculation, but rather from intuition, and a desire to follow internalized social rules. If people 
perceive that an action is inappropriate and not in line with the rule or with the social norm, 
people will not take that action.  
From this point of view, it would be interesting examine the correlation between a person’s 
actions in the more or less game, and their perception of what the social norm is. If the people 




keep less money in the more or less game, that could indicate that social norms indeed have 
an effect on behavior in the more or less game.  
An experiment using a within-subject design, where participants both make actual decision in 
the more or less game, and evaluate the appropriateness of all actions in the game, could be 
used to examine this question. With both behavioral data and norm data from each individual, 
it will be possible to use a slightly altered version of the model presented in this paper, which 
allows the perception of the social norm to vary with each individual: 
 
𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑘) = 𝑉(𝜋𝑖(𝑎𝑘)) +  𝛾𝑵𝒊(𝑎𝑘) 
 
When conducting such an experiment, carryover effects and experimenter demand effects 
could potentially affect the results, so careful design of the experiment would be required. 
D'Adda, Drouvelis et al. (2016) test for order-effects when eliciting social norms with a 
within-subject design and the method from Krupka and Weber (2013). They find that in 
general, order-effects in norm-elicitation experiments are small and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.  
On the other hand, some evidence suggests that eliciting social norms before making actual 
choices, could lead to a focusing effect of norms on behavior, where behavior that is 
considered appropriate becomes more common and behavior that is considered inappropriate 
less common. To avoid this potential effect, D'Adda, Drouvelis et al. (2016) suggest eliciting 
social norms after participants have made a choice in the decision situation.  
Considering that this paper does not find a general effect of a well-defined and agreed-upon 
social norm on behavior in the more or less game, but does find evidence of large 
heterogeneity in people’s perception of the social norm, further research with a model that 
takes into account individual perceptions of the social norms would be highly interesting. 
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Appendix A –Invitation mail 
Invitation email - Norwegian 
Hei 
Du er invitert til å delta i et eksperiment tirsdag 28.02.17. Du vil motta 50 kroner for oppmøte, 
og eksperimentet er finansiert av Universitetet i Bergen. 
I tillegg til dette kan du tjene ytterligere penger. Disse pengene utbetales til deg når 
eksperimentet er over. Eksperimentet utføres anonymt, og det er frivillig å delta. Det kreves 
ingen forkunnskaper. 
Eksperimentet varer omtrent 15 minutter, og vil holdes på Medborgerlaben i Sofie Lindstrøms 
hus (Rosenbergsgaten 35) i andre etasje.  
Du kan melde deg på ved å logge på din profil her: https://medborgerlab.app.uib.no/ 
Invitation email – English translation 
Hi 
You are invited to participate in an experiment on Tuesday 28.02.17. You will receive a 
show-up fee of 50 kroner, and the experiment is financed by The University of Bergen. 
Additionally, you can earn more money. This money will be paid to you when the experiment 
is over. The experiment is anonymous, and participation is voluntary. No prerequisites are 
needed.  
The experiment will take around 15 minutes, and will be held at The Citizen Lab in Sofie 
Lindstrøms hus (Rosenbergsgaten 35).  










Appendix B –Written instructions for the more or less experiment 
Norwegian: 
Deltaker ______  
Vennligst fyll ut: 
 
Kjønn: 
Kvinne ____ Mann ____ 
 
Hvor mange semestre har du studert på høgskole eller universitet? 
Første semester ____  Andre semester ____ 
Tredje semester ____  Flere enn tre semester ____  
 
Har du deltatt i lignende eksperiment før? 
Nei ____ Ja, 1 gang ____ Ja, 2 ganger ____ Ja, 3 eller flere ____ 
 
På neste side vil dere bli presentert for to spørsmål hvor dere i begge blir bedt om å ta en 
avgjørelse. Vennligst svar på begge spørsmålene. Når eksperimentet er over, vil 2 personer i 
rommet trekkes ut til å få realisert sitt valg enten i spørsmål 1 eller spørsmål 2. Valget du tar 
er helt anonymt, og vil ikke ha innvirkning på sannsynligheten for å bli trukket ut til å motta 
penger. 
English translation: 
Participant ______  
 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
Gender: 
Female ____ Male ____ 
 
How many semesters have you completed at University or University College? 
One semester ____  Two semesters ____ 
Three semesters ____  More than three semesters ____  
 
Have you participated in similar experiments before? 
No ____ Yes, 1 time ____ Yes, 2 times ____ Yes, 3 or more times ____ 
 
 
On the next page you will be presented with two questions, where you will have to make a 
decision. Please answer both questions. When the experiment is over, 2 persons in the room 
will be drawn to have their decisions realized, in either question 1 or question 2. The decision 







Treatment instructions (Norwegian) 
Dictator game: 
Spørsmål 
Person A trekkes ut til å motta 800 kroner. Dersom du trekkes ut til å være person A, må du 
på forhånd velge hvor mye av pengene du ønsker å beholde. Pengene du ikke beholder selv, 
vil bli gitt til en annen tilfeldig trukket person, person B. Du kan velge mellom å beholde 800 
kroner, 600 kroner, 400 kroner, 200 kroner eller 0 kroner.  
  
Jeg velger å beholde:  Ditt svar 
Behold 800 kr 
(800 kr til deg, 0 kr til person B) 
  
Behold 600 kr 
(600 kr til deg, 200 kr til person B) 
  
Behold 400 kr 
(400 kr til deg, 400 kr til person B) 
  
Behold 200 kr 
(200 kr til deg, 600 kr til person B) 
  
Behold 0 kr 
(0 kr til deg, 800 kr til person B) 
  
 
More or less game: 
Spørsmål 
En person trekkes ut til å motta 800 kroner. Dersom du trekkes ut, må du på forhånd velge 
hvor mye av pengene du ønsker å beholde. Du kan velge mellom å beholde 800 kroner, 600 
kroner, 400 kroner, 200 kroner eller 0 kroner.  
  
  





















Appendix C –Written instructions for the norm elicitation 





Kvinne ____ Mann ____ 
 
Hvor mange semestre har du studert på høgskole eller universitet? 
Første semester ____  Andre semester ____ 
Tredje semester ____  Flere enn tre semester ____  
 
Har du deltatt i lignende eksperiment før? 


























I dette eksperimentet vil du bli presentert for ulike hypotetiske situasjoner der «Person A» står 
overfor et valg. Situasjonen vil bli presentert med en beskrivelse av valget personen står 
overfor, samt mulige handlinger.  
 
Etter at du har lest beskrivelsen av situasjonen, vil du bli bedt om å evaluere hvor sosialt 
akseptabel og i samsvar med god moral og passende oppførsel, hver av de ulike handlingene 
er. Handlingene skal evalueres på en skala fra «Veldig sosialt uakseptabelt» til «Veldig sosialt 
akseptabelt.» Med sosialt akseptabelt mener vi oppførsel som folk flest vil være enig om at er 
«rett» eller «etisk». En annen måte å forstå det på, er at dersom en person velger en sosialt 
uakseptabel handling, vil andre kunne bli opprørt over personens oppførsel. For å gi en idé om 




Person A er på en kafé nær universitetet. Her oppdager Person A at noen har glemt 
lommeboken sin på et av bordene. Person A må bestemme seg for hva som skal gjøres med 
lommeboken. Det er fire mulige handlinger: Ta lommeboken, spørre andre i nærheten om de 
eier lommeboken, la lommeboken ligge der den er eller gi lommeboken til personalet.  
Vennligst evaluer hver av de ulike handlingene, marker dine svar med et kryss. Eksempel: 
 








Ta lommeboken X 
   
Spørre andre i 
nærheten  








til personalet  





Etter eksperimentet vil det trekkes ut en tilfeldig handling. Av de deltakerne som har 
evaluert denne handlingen likt som flesteparten av de andre deltakerne, trekkes 3 
deltakere ut og får utbetalt 500 kr. Dersom du har evaluert handlingen ulikt flesteparten 

















Female ____ Male ____ 
 
How many semesters have you completed at University or University College? 
One semester ____  Two semesters ____ 
Three semesters ____  More than three semesters ____  
 
Have you participated in similar experiments before? 























In this experiment, you will be presented with different hypothetical situations where “Person 
A” have to make a decision. The situations will be presented with a description of the decision 
making problem and possible actions Person A can take.  
 
After having read the description of the situation, you will be asked to evaluate how socially 
appropriate and consistent with moral or proper social behavior, each action Person A can 
take, is. The actions are evaluated on a scale from “Very socially inappropriate” to “Very 
socially appropriate.” With socially appropriate we mean behavior that most people would 
agree is correct or ethical. Another way to understand it, is that if a person were to choose a 
socially inappropriate action, others might be angry or upset about the persons behavior. To 




Person A is at a coffee shop near the university. Here, Person A discover that someone has 
left their wallet on one of the tables. Person A have to make a decision on what to do with the 
wallet. There are four possible actions: Take the wallet, ask others nearby if they own the 
wallet, leave the wallet where it is or give the wallet to the personnel at the coffee shop. 
Please evaluate each of the possible actions, mark your answers with a cross. Example: 
 
 













   
Ask others 
nearby  
   
X 
Leave the 





Give the wallet 
to the 
personnel   





After the experiment, a random action will be drawn. From the participants who have 
evaluated this action in the same way as most others have, 3 participants will be drawn 
and to receive a payment of 500 kr. If you have evaluated the action differently than 








Treatment instructions (Norwegian) 
Dictator game: 
Anta at Person A er med i en trekning om å motta 800 kr. Person A må velge hvor mye av 
pengene som beholdes. Det som ikke beholdes, blir gitt til en tilfeldig trukket person, person 
B. Person A kan velge mellom å beholde 800 kroner, 600 kroner, 400 kr, 200 kroner eller 0 
kroner. 
  
Tabellen under viser de ulike valgene person A kan foreta seg. Vennligst indiker hvor sosialt 
akseptabelt hver av de fem handlingene er. Husk at du er med i trekningen om 500kr dersom 
din evaluering av en tilfeldig trukket handling, er lik evalueringen til flertallet av de andre 
deltakerne. Marker dine svar med kryss. 
  
  












(800 kr til A, 0 kr til B) 
        
Behold 600 
(600 kr til A, 200 kr til B) 
        
Behold 400 
(400 kr til A, 400 kr til B ) 
        
Behold 200 
(200 kr til A, 600 kr til B) 
        
Behold 0 
(0 kr til A, 800 kr til B) 
        
 
More or less game: 
Anta at Person A er med i en trekning om å motta 800 kr. Før trekningen finner sted, må 
person A velge hvor mye av en eventuell gevinst som skal beholdes. Person A kan velge 
mellom å beholde 800 kroner, beholde 600 kroner, beholde 400 kr, beholde 200 kr eller 
beholde 0 kr. 
  
Tabellen under viser de ulike valgene person A kan foreta seg. Vennligst indiker hvor sosialt 
akseptabelt hver av de tre handlingene er. Husk at du er med i trekningen om 500kr dersom din 
evaluering av en tilfeldig trukket handling, er lik evalueringen til flertallet av de andre 
deltakerne. Marker dine svar med kryss. 
  
  













        
Behold 600 
(600 kr) 
        
Behold 400 
(400 kr) 
        
Behold 200 
(200 kr) 
        
Behold 0 
(0 kr) 




Appendix D – Figure 3 and Figure 4 - Standard errors and 95% 
confidence intervals (mean appropriateness ratings)  
Figure 3 
Norm profile - Dictator game 
Money kept Mean SE 95% Conf. interval 
0kr 0.32 0.07 [0.20    0.45] 
200kr 0.57 0.05 [0.47    0.66] 
400kr 0.93 0.02 [0.89    0.97] 
600kr 0.27 0.05 [0.17    0.36] 
800kr -0.25 0.07 [-0.38    -0.12] 
 
Norm profile - More or less game 
Money kept Mean SE 95% Conf. interval 
0kr 0.13 0.08 [-0.02    0.28] 
200kr 0.43 0.06 [0.31    0.55] 
400kr 0.66 0.05 [0.56    0.76] 
600kr 0.57 0.06 [0.45    0.68] 
800kr 0.59 0.07 [0.46    0.72] 
 
Figure 4 
Norm profile - Dictator game 
Money kept Mean SE 95% Conf. interval 
0kr 0.20 0.12 [-0.05    0.45] 
200kr 0.50 0.08  [0.33    0.67] 
400kr 0.79 0.08 [0.63    0.95] 
600kr 0.23 0.08 [0.08    0.38] 







Norm profile - More or less game 
Money kept Mean SE 95% Conf. interval 
0kr 0.28 0.13 [0.01    0.55] 
200kr 0.58 0.09 [0.40    0.77] 
400kr 0.65 0.08 [0.48    0.82] 
600kr 0.55 0.09 [0.37    0.73] 



























Appendix E –Robustness of the conditional logit model 
Conditional logit with appropriateness ratings from lab experiment: 
Regressions in Table 8 use the same specifications as the regressions reported in Table 6. 
 
Table 8 – Conditional (fixed-effect) logistic regression with behavioral data from both ex. 
Elicited appropriateness ratings from the lab experiment 
 Model Model 
Behavioral data (1) (2) 
   
Payoff (𝛽)     0.008***     0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Appropriateness rating (𝛾)     3.250***     3.474*** 
 (0.471) (0.536) 
Appropriateness rating X Treatment      14.757*** 
  (8.640) 
   
Log-likelihood -102.990 -101.023 
Observations 575 575 
Subjects 115 115 
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0. 01; all two-tailed. Bootstrapped standard errors (1000 reps) are in 
parentheses. Treatment = 1 if More or less, 0 if Dictator games 
 
Regressions in Table 9 use the same specifications as the regressions reported in Table 7. 
 
Table 9 – Conditional (fixed-effect) logistic regression with behavioral data from either the 
dictator game or the more or less game. Elicited appropriateness ratings from the lab 
experiment 
Behavioral data  More or less game Dictator game 
 
  Model (3) Model 
    
Payoff (𝛽)             0.008***     0.010*   
    (0.002)   (0.006) 
Appropriateness rating (𝛾)         16.889*  3.896 
    (9.058) (2.005) 
    
Log-likelihood  -35.561 -65.330 
Observations  285 290 
Subjects  57 58 
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0. 01; all two-tailed. Bootstrapped standard errors (1000 reps) are in 
parentheses, In model (3), only 997 replications were completed. 
Model (3) use behavioral data only from more or less game, Model (4) use behavioral data 





Appendix F –Predictions  
Predictions based on model 1 in Table 6, using appropriateness ratings from the 

















































Predictions based on model 1 in Table 7, using appropriateness ratings from the lab 
















































Predictions based on model 2 in Table 7, using appropriateness ratings from the lab 
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